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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                        
_____________ 
 
No. 15-2196 
_____________ 
 
RAYMOND PRICE, III; 
LYNN M. PRICE, 
      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
Nos. 1:13-4301; 1:13-8470 
                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 3, 2016 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH, and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 7, 2016)                              
_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________        
                       
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 
 In a comprehensive memorandum opinion dated December 16, 2014, the 
                                                 
 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
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United States Tax Court upheld, as explained therein, the tax deficiencies 
determined by the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service for taxable years 
2009 through 2011 against appellants.  This timely appeal followed.1  Appellants 
contend that the Tax Court erred in finding (1) that their horse farm and 
automobile dealership undertakings were not a single activity, and (2) that the 
horse farm undertaking was not conducted for profit.  We will affirm for the 
reasons stated below and for the reasons articulated by the Tax Court in its 
December 16, 2014, memorandum opinion. 
 “While we conduct plenary review of the Tax Court’s legal conclusions, we 
review its factual findings, including its ultimate finding as to the economic 
substance of a transaction, for clear error.”  Crispin v. Comm’r, 708 F.3d 507, 514 
(3d Cir. 2013) (quoting ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
“The Commissioner’s deficiency determination is entitled to a presumption of 
correctness and . . . the burden of production as well as the ultimate burden of 
persuasion is placed on the taxpayer.”  Id. (quoting Anastasato v. Comm’r, 794 
F.2d 884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986)).  The taxpayer must “prov[e] entitlement to a 
claimed deduction by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Blodgett v. Comm’r, 394 
F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 2005); Tax Court Rule 142(a).  This burden may shift 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
1 The Tax Court had jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 6213(a), 6214, and 7442.  We have 
jurisdiction over final orders of the Tax Court pursuant to I.R.C. § 7482(a).   
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back to the Commissioner if the taxpayer introduces credible evidence with respect 
to any relevant factual issue and meets other conditions, including maintaining 
required records.  I.R.C. § 7491(a); Blodgett, 394 F.3d at 1035.   
 Treasury Regulation 1.183-1(d)(1) states that “[g]enerally, the 
Commissioner will accept the characterization by the taxpayer of several 
undertakings either as a single activity or as separate activities.”  Such deference to 
the taxpayer will not be given, however, “when it appears that his characterization 
is artificial and cannot be reasonably supported under the facts and circumstances 
of the case.”  Id.  The regulation provides several factors to be considered in 
determining whether two undertakings are part of the same activity.  As a general 
rule, “all the facts and circumstances of the case must be taken into account.”  Id.  
However, “the most significant facts and circumstances in making this 
determination are the degree of organizational and economic interrelationship of 
various undertakings, the business purpose which is (or might be) served by 
carrying on the various undertakings separately or together in a trade or business or 
in an investment setting, and the similarity of various undertakings.”  Id.   
 In addition to the factors explicitly listed in Treasury Regulation 1.183-
1(d)(1), courts consider other factors in determining whether the taxpayer’s 
characterization is reasonable.  These factors are:  
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(a) [w]hether the undertakings are conducted at the same place; 
(b) whether the undertakings were part of the taxpayer’s efforts 
to find sources of revenue from his or her land; (c) whether the 
undertakings were formed as separate businesses; (d) whether 
one undertaking benefited from the other; (e) whether the 
taxpayer used one undertaking to advertise the other; (f) the 
degree to which the undertakings shared management; (g) the 
degree to which one caretaker oversaw the assets of both 
undertakings; (h) whether the taxpayer used the same 
accountant for the undertakings; and (i) the degree to which the 
undertakings shared books or records. 
 
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 92 T.C.M. (CCH) 17, *4 (2006).  The Tax Court thoroughly 
analyzed both the regulation’s enumerated factors and the Mitchell factors, and its 
determination that appellants’ horse farm and automobile dealership undertakings 
were not part of the same activity is not clearly erroneous.  
 Appellants have also failed to show that the horse farm undertaking was 
conducted with a profit motive.  Treasury Regulation 1.183-2(b) enumerates nine 
non-exclusive factors to be considered in determining whether an activity is 
conducted for profit: (1) the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; 
(2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors; (3) the time and effort expended 
by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in 
the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying on 
other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer’s history of income or losses 
with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which were 
earned; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) elements of personal 
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pleasure or recreation.  Again, “[n]o one factor is determinative in making this 
determination,” and all facts and circumstances are to be taken into account.  26 
C.F.R. § 1.183-2(b).  Again, the Tax Court thoroughly analyzed these factors and 
did not commit clear error in determining that the horse farm undertaking was not 
conducted with a profit motive.   
 For the reasons stated herein, and for the reasons stated in the Tax Court’s 
December 16, 2014, memorandum opinion, we will affirm the order of the Tax 
Court.    
 
